The heparin scare highlights the need not only for more effective systems of adverse event reporting and product tracking, but also for drug makers to tighten scrutiny of their suppliers.
T his year's harrowing revelations of over 80 deaths and hundreds of serious adverse events involving the blood-thinning drug heparin have prompted the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to announce an overhaul in its procedures for inspecting drug manufacturing plants in China. They have also prompted the US Congress to miraculously rediscover largesse for agency funding. Many of the simple fixes proposed by FDA to address the inadequacies of the present inspection system-more manufacturing site visits, increased numbers of translators and inspectors and bureaus established on foreign soilare welcome. In the long run, however, these changes are unlikely to make much of a difference to those intent on compromising the integrity of pharmaceutical supply chains that are becoming increasingly globalized and complex. The reality is other solutions are needed.
On page 669, a collaboration of FDA, industrial and academic researchers presents evidence that the contaminant found in batches of heparin is oversulfated chondroitin sulfate (OSCS). The impurity is a cheap and plentiful substance obtained from animal cartilage that mimics heparin in standard assays. When present in contaminated heparin batches or synthesized chemically, OSCS both causes kallikrein activation and induces hypotension when administered intravenously to pigs (N. Engl. J. Med. doi:10.1056 /NEJMoa0803200, 23 April, 2008 . The work is the foundation for the new nuclear magnetic resonance and capillary electrophoresis tests for the detection of OSCS in heparin batches announced by the FDA in March. The agency deserves particular praise for the speed with which it brought together this team of researchers and disseminated the data to regulatory agencies around the world.
At the same time, however, serious bureaucratic gaffes were made. In 2004, for example, Baxter International, the manufacturer of the tainted heparin, informed the agency that its supplier, Scientific Protein Laboratories (SPL), was switching sourcing to a plant in Changzhou. Because a staffer mistakenly identified the facility for another with a similar name that had already been checked, FDA failed to inspect the plant. It also appears that despite a memorandum of understanding signed by the US and Chinese governments last December, FDA inspectors have been barred from investigating the matter further down the Chinese supply chain. And herein lies the root of the problem-most of China's huge cottage industry that prepares the raw heparin from pig intestines is completely unregulated.
The FDA's investigation has ruled out problems with components or packaging at Baxter's New Jersey plant. In February, however, inspectors identified several "potentially objectionable conditions" related to the removal of impurities, process validation, equipment cleaning, waste handling and product testing in SPL Changzhou. Baxter claims many similar problems were found when the company audited the plant last September. Clearly these problems were not fixed.
Although FDA has not yet definitively confirmed that heparin was purposefully adulterated with OSCS, it seems likely this is what happened. To date, no rational explanation has been brought forward for how OSCS could accidentally end up in heparin lots. OSCS is also much cheaper than heparin and would thus make economic sense as a substitute. And OSCS looks just like heparin in the standard assays used by regulators and industry, ensuring that it remained undetected for a considerable time.
If anyone was entertaining the notion that the heparin recall would dampen industry enthusiasm for outsourcing, a report published last month by Contract Pharma (http://www.contractpharma.com/articles/ 2008/05/2008-annual-outsourcing-survey) suggests otherwise. In the coming year, over half of all drug companies plan to boost their outsourcing spending by 6% or more. Outsourcing drug research and manufacturing as a means of keeping overheads low and controlling raw ingredient cost, particularly in the face of pricing pressures in Europe and the US, continues to be attractive (see p. 621 and p. 624). And as outsourcing continues to grow, creating longer and more complex drug supply lines, the potential for future incidents will only increase.
Clearly, ensuring the integrity of the drug supply chain is a gargantuan task. Over 100,000 establishments around the world are currently regulated by the FDA. China alone is thought to house over 700 facilities. In this context, no single agency-not the FDA, nor the European Medicines Agency nor any other regulator-has the resources or manpower to police product purity on a case-by-case basis. There are simply too many products and too many manufacturers.
What's more, anyone intent on compromising the integrity of the drug supply chain will inevitably find a weak point. Tainted heparin is a case in point. There is no reason that the more rigorous inspection procedures currently being implemented by FDA in China would catch the problem today without the new, more sophisticated assays for OSCS. Regulators cannot monitor for every impurity masquerading as an active ingredient; they can only look for the ones that make patients sick.
Thus, FDA moves to improve the system of foreign manufacturing inspections remain a necessary but insufficient step. What will really save lives in the future is the introduction of more advanced systems of adverse event reporting that can quickly flag when something has gone awry with a product and more standardized procedures for tracking and tracing pharmaceuticals that will enable the compromised points in the supply chain to be identified more rapidly.
But the industry must play its part as well. Drug makers that outsource manufacturing need to make greater investments in controls and oversight of their products and suppliers. After all, it is manufacturers that have most to benefit from the lower ingredient costs from overseas suppliers. And it is they that should be held directly responsible for product failures and penalized by the courts if they do harm. Anything less and industry will have many more patient deaths on its hands.
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